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Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding that Limits Eligibility
for Probation or Parole Release

This article addresses the impact of Alleyne v. United States'
on state statutes that restrict an offender's eligibility for
release on parole or probation. Alleyne is the latest of several
Supreme Court cases applying the rule announced in the
Court's 2000 decision, Apprendi v. New Jersey. In Apprendi
the Court held that the government must establish beyond
a reasonable doubt to a jury any fact (other than prior conviction) that permits the judge to impose a higher maximum sentence. For thirteen years, the Court used this
ceiling-raising metric each time it applied its rule to a new
context. In Alleyne, the Court modified that principle, and
declared that the Apprendi rule not only applies to findings
that permit a higher maximum sentence, but also applies to
findings that mandate a higher minimum sentence. Because
federal law required that the judge in Alleyne's case impose
a sentence of no less than seven years' incarceration for the
crime of "using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime
of violence" if Alleyne had "brandished" a firearm, Alleyne
had a right to seek a jury's determination of that aggravating
fact.
To apply Alleyne, courts must for the first time determine what constitutes a minimum sentence and when that
minimum is mandatory. These questions have proven
challenging for judges in states that authorize indeterminate sentences (subject to discretionary release on parole)
and have statutes that delay the timing of eligibility for
release based upon judicial findings at sentencing. Alleyne
also raises similar questions, in both determinate and
indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions, for statutes that
deny or restrict the option of imposing probation or a
suspended sentence instead of incarceration upon judicial
fact finding. Disagreement about Alleyne's application is
understandable; extending Alleyne to findings that alter
eligibility for release has the potential to disrupt significantly the sentencing systems in several states.
In this Article, we argue that Alleyne invalidates any state
statute that, upon a judicial finding of fact at sentencing
(other than prior conviction), requires a judge to delay or
deny eligibility for release on probation or parole. The floor
of the sentencing range for an indeterminate sentence is
the period of incarceration the offender must serve before
he can be considered for release on parole. In states such as
Michigan and Pennsylvania, statutes that require the judge
to impose a longer term prior to eligibility once certain facts
are found operate just like the statute in Alleyne, increasing

the minimum sentence. Precluding probation based on
a judicially found fact also raises the floor of the penalty
range under Alleyne, aggravating it from a noncustodial
sentence to incarceration.
Alleyne's threat to existing statutes varies by state.
Some states will avoid the problem entirely. Arkansas,
Mississippi, and New York, for example, can essentially
ignore Alleyne because statutes that delay or deny parole or
probation eligibility apply to every defendant convicted of
specified offenses; no additional factfinding (with the
exception of prior conviction3 ) must occur at sentencing
before those minimum sentences apply. A number of other
states, including California, Colorado, Hawaii, and West
Virginia, do have statutes restricting eligibility for release
on parole or probation upon judicial findings of particular
facts, but will escape post-Alleyne challenges to these particular statutes because state law already requires juries to
decide those facts. Presently, however, sixteen statesAlaska, Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island-have one or more statutory provisions that limit either parole or probation eligibility based
on additional judicial findings at sentencing, provisions we
argue are unconstitutional after Alleyne.
This count of affected states would have included Kansas as well, but Kansas lawmakers, prompted by a remand
from the Supreme Court,4 swiftly recognized the vulnerability under Alleyne of state statutes limiting parole eligibility for convicted murderers. In an emergency legislative
session, they amended the law to require jury findings.5
Other states have been slower to react. New Jersey's high
court has agreed to review the issue.6 Lower courts in
Pennsylvania have admitted Alleyne's probable impact
on statutes in that state.7 By contrast, in Michigan, with
a sentencing system built upon minimum parole-eligibility
ranges, state courts have confronted and rejected arguments that Alleyne renders the state's sentencing scheme
unconstitutional.
Remarkably, although dozens of state laws limiting
probation or parole release are unconstitutional after
Alleyne, sentencing scholars seem not to have noticed.
One explanation for this blind spot may be that much of the
academic writing about sentencing focuses on federal law,
and federal courts have not yet grappled with this issue.
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Federal defendants prosecuted today would not encounter
a judge-found parole limitation at sentencing; discretionary
release on parole was abolished for federal defendants in
the i98os.8 As for probation, federal statutes limiting probation eligibility upon a finding of fact other than conviction are rare. 9 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines contain
many such provisions, but they are now advisory.'0 And
although Alleyne is a constitutional rule that state defendants are already raising in federal habeas proceedings, as a
"new" rule it will be available only to those prisoners whose
convictions were not yet final in 2013. As a consequence, it
may be some time before the lower federal courts address
the application of Alleyne to parole and probation eligibility
provisions in the states." For the time being, judicial discussion of the issue has been limited to state decisions.
This article provides analyses that litigants and judges
might find useful as these Alleyne challenges make their
way through the courts. It also offers a menu of options for
state lawmakers who would prefer to amend their sentencing law proactively in order to minimize disruption of
their criminal justice systems.
I. The Ruling in Alleyne
Apprendi v. New Jersey,3 the source of the rule extended by
the Court in Alleyne, grew out of legislative efforts to
structure judicial sentencing discretion. Beginning in the
1970s, new statutes tied factfinding at sentencing to higher
sentencing ranges. Initially, the Court tolerated this practice. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,'4 it held that a defendant's
constitutional rights were not violated by a statute that
raised the minimum penalty for an offense to five years if
the judge found at sentencing that the defendant had a gun,
noting that the finding did not change the maximum
punishment the judge could impose for that conviction.
A finding that raises only the floor of the sentencing range,
the Court reasoned, is not an element of the offense, that is,
part of the charge that must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to a jury.' 5
Apprendi involved just the situation distinguished in
McMillan-a statute that exposed the defendant to a higher
punishment ceiling based on a judicial finding of fact at
sentencing.' 6 The Court held that under the Sixth
Amendment, such a fact must be considered an element of
what is essentially an aggravated offense, and that permitting a judge to determine that fact at sentencing deprived
the defendant of his right to a jury determination of every
element of an offense. Other than the fact of prior conviction, the Court held, "any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." 7 The Court later clarified that when a finding of
fact is required to impose a sentence above a binding
guideline range,'5 or to impose a higher maximum fine,' 9
it falls within the Apprendi rule.
Although confirming that the rule in Apprendi applied
whenever a fact found by the judge raised the ceiling of
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a sentencing range, the Court in Harrisv. United States2 0
declined to overrule McMillan and extend the rule to judicial factfinding that raised the punishment floor. Not until
2013 did a new five-justice majority overrule Harrisand
McMillan, concluding in Alleyne that "the principle applied
in Apprendi applies with equal force to facts increasing the
mandatory minimum."
Alleyne, like Harris, had been convicted of violating
a federal statute that designated a sentence of "not less than
5 years" for anyone who "uses or carries a firearm" in relation to a "crime of violence," and "not less than 7 years" "if
the firearm is brandished."" The jury that convicted Alleyne
indicated on the verdict form that he had "[u]sed or carried
a firearm" but did not indicate a finding that the firearm was
"[b]randished."2 3 At sentencing Alleyne argued that because
the jury did not find brandishing beyond a reasonable doubt,
he was subject only to the five-year mandatory minimum.
Relying on Harris,the judge rejected this argument, found
that the government had established brandishing by a preponderance of the evidence, and imposed a sentence of
seven years. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority in Alleyne,
traced the "linkage of facts with particular sentence ranges
(defined by both the minimum and the maximum)" at
common law, and noted "a well-established practice of
including in the indictment, and submitting to the jury,
every fact that was a basis for imposing or increasing
punishment."2 4 This rule, he explained, allowed the
defendant to predict the judgment, if convicted, from the
face of the indictment. A "fact increasing either end of the
range produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient
of the offense," he wrote. "Elevating the low-end of a sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with
the crime: the defendant's 'expected punishment has
increased as a result of the narrowed range' and 'the prosecution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment
than he might wish.'-5 The Sixth Amendment, he

explained, "applies where a finding of fact both alters the
legally prescribed range and does so in a way that aggravates
the penalty.""' He reiterated that the Constitution's protections, rooted in the common law, ensured that a criminal
charge would inform the accused what the punishment will
be and that all facts essential to that punishment would be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury before that
punishment could be imposed. 7 Justice Breyer, providing
the fifth vote, noted in a separate opinion that even though
he continued to disagree with Apprendi, he concurred with
the Court's decision because it seemed "highly anomalous
to read Apprendi as insisting that juries find sentencing
facts that permit a judge to impose a higher sentence while
not insisting that juries find sentencing facts that require
a judge to impose a higher sentence."'
II: Applying Alleyne to Eligibility Statutes
To determine the scope of the new rule in Alleyne, courts
must decide when state law conditions a "mandatory

*
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minimum" sentence upon factfinding by the judge.
Analytically, it is helpful to separate this inquiry into two
parts, as the Court suggested when it stated in Alleyne that
the rule applies when "a finding of fact both alters the legally
prescribed range and does so in a way that aggravates the
penalty."2 9 We examine first when a restriction on
a defendant's eligibility for release constitutes a more
aggravated minimum sentence, and second when that
restriction is mandatory, that is, when factfinding alters
"the legally prescribedrange." We also address opposing
arguments based on history, implementation, and scope.
A. Defining When a Restriction on Eligibility for
Release Constitutes the "Minimum" Sentence
The minimum term in Alleyne was clear; the statute stated
the sentence as "not less than 5 years" or, with brandishing,
"not less than 7 years." Alleyne's federal sentence was
determinate-that is, the term of incarceration was set at
sentencing and not subject to early release by paroling
authorities. Federal defendants receive a single sentence and
serve that sentence; they are not sentenced to a range within
which they might or might not be released depending on
decisions by paroling authorities at a later time.
1. Term Before Release Eligibility as "Minimum"
Unlike the federal courts, a majority of states continue to
impose indeterminate sentences. In these states, where
a parole board or other paroling authority retains the option
of releasing an offender before the maximum sentence
imposed is served, what is the "minimum" sentence for
purposes of Alleyne? Logically, the minimum, or floor of the
sentencing range, is the period of incarceration that must
be served before a defendant may first be considered for
release. For example, if release is barred until after the
offender has served fifty years, then the minimum sentence
is fifty years. Many states equate eligibility dates with
minimum sentence. 30 The parole eligibility date in a system of discretionary release is just as impermeable a floor
as the minimum seven-year term in the determinate sentencing system in Alleyne.
The rule in Alleyne comes into play whenever a more
severe or "aggravated" minimum sentence is triggered by
a factual finding at sentencing. Thus, if a statute requires
the judge who finds a specified fact at sentencing to impose
a term of incarceration with a release eligibility date that is
later than the date that would apply in the absence of that
finding, the defendant has a right to a jury determination of
that specified fact. By delaying eligibility for release, the
finding "[e]levat[es] the low-end of a sentencing range and
3
heightens the loss of liberty associated with the crime." '
The same is true if the fact eliminates eligibility for release.
Although some states do not delegate decisions about
32
the timing of parole eligibility to the sentencing judge,
many states do expect judges to select the minimum term,
and have enacted statutes that require the judge to delay or
deny eligibility for release on parole based on a finding of
fact at sentencing. All of these statutes are potentially

unconstitutional under Alleyne. These provisions include
restrictions on release for offenders whose offense occurred
while on release for another crime,33 whose crime involved
gangs34 or weapons,35 victimized police officers,36 children,
or the elderly,37 or involved other circumstances not proven
as part of the underlying offense.38 For example, before it
was amended after Alleyne to require jury findings, a statute
in Kansas required the judge to order a defendant convicted
of premeditated murder to serve at least forty years before
becoming eligible for release on parole ("a hard-4 0" sentence)39 if the judge found that the defendant committed
the murder "in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner," 40 or had a previous felony conviction "in which
4
the defendant inflicted great bodily harm." '
One difference between the determinate sentence in
Alleyne and an indeterminate sentence is that once a federal
sentence is served, the offender is always released, but once
an offender serving an indeterminate sentence reaches
eligibility for parole, he need not be released. One might
argue that in an indeterminate system, the minimum sentence is not the earliest eligibility date that the law allows the
judge to set, but instead is whatever term the paroling
authority later decides the offender must serve. But this
would miss the point of the Apprendi/Alleyne line of cases.
The Apprendi rule targets statutes that essentially shortcircuit the Bill of Rights requirements of notice and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury by shifting factfinding
that determines the sentencing range away from the trial to
the sentencing phase. The minimum sentence that matters
in Alleyne is the floor of the range available to the sentencing
judge, the penalty "affixed to the crime,"14 not the sentence
that might actually be served by the offender. That a paroling
authority may ultimately decide not to release the defendant
when he first becomes eligible is irrelevant. What is crucial is
that the legislature has narrowed the penalty range available
to the trial judge once the specified fact is determined.
Similarly, because Alleyne is concerned only with factfinding that legislatures have given to judges rather than
juries, delays in release eligibility that result from the
decisions of corrections officials made after initial sentencing, even when such decisions depend upon findings
of fact, are not affected by Alleyne.43 Corrections officials'
decisions denying release on parole after eligibility, delaying release eligibility by refusing to grant or revoking good
44
time credit (also called earned or gain time credit),
reclassifying the prisoner so that his ability to earn good
time credit is reduced,45 as well as findings by corrections
officials regarding satisfaction of statutory criteria for
release after the date of first eligibility,46 including medical
conditions47 and overcrowding,4 8 all fall outside of the
Apprendi principle. These decisions may change the actual
sentence served, but they do not "increase[] either end of
the range" available to the sentencing judge.
2. Alternatives to Incarceration as "Minimum"
Probation eligibility statutes in both determinate and
indeterminate sentencing jurisdictions are vulnerable after
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Alleyne as well. Courts have already found that when state
law designates probation as the presumptive sentence
maximum for a minor offense, judicial factfinding that
authorizes incarceration operates to raise the ceiling of the
penalty range and thus triggers the rule in Apprendi. 49 This
is because incarceration is a more severe sentence than
probation, making the additional fact permitting incarceration an element of a more aggravated offense. Similarly, if,
upon a specified finding at sentencing, a statute removes
the judge's ability to impose probation, suspend a sentence,
or impose an alternative to incarceration, that finding raises
the floor of the penalty range under Alleyne, aggravating it
from a potential noncustodial penalty to required
incarceration.
Examples of such statutes include provisions denying
probation for those who have refused drug treatment,50
victimized children or family members, 5' committed their
offenses while on release from or awaiting trial on another
crime,52 or used firearms." All of these provisions are
threatened by the holding in Alleyne. Also implicated are
statutes that upon a finding of fact by the judge mandate
higher minimum terms of supervised release after serving
a teim of incarceration54 or higher minimum fines as part
55
of the sentence.
3. Rebutting Opposing Arguments
To oppose the characterization of eligibility restrictions as
minimum sentences, we anticipate states will raise three
arguments, drawing from the reasoning in the Court's
Apprendi cases.
a. Lack of Historical Basis. First, states may argue that
both parole and probation are relatively modern inventions,
lacking the historical pedigree of the graded terms of
incarceration that appeared in early American criminal
codes. Decisions affecting eligibility for parole or probation
would have been completely unknown in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. Discretionary parole release
and the option of using community supervision in lieu of
incarceration swept the nation only in the early twentieth
century.56 If the meaning of the Sixth Amendment's Jury
Clause is limited to the historical context surrounding its
adoption, then it may not regulate factfinding that alters
eligibility for probation or parole.57 Indeed, Justice Thomas,
the author of Alleyne, has been one of the most consistent
voices on the Court for adherence to historical context in
5
interpreting the Jury Clause.'
The Court did rely upon history to derive its general rule
in Apprendi,59 but it has refused to use history as a litmus
test for each and every application of that general rule. Early
American criminal codes appeared not to include statutes
like the one in Alleyne, for example, that keyed a higher
minimum sentence to a particular fact, but did not at the
same time raise the maximum sentence.Yo Sentencing
guidelines like those in Blakely or Booker were also creatures
of the late twentieth century, but this novelty did not exempt
them from the Apprendi rule either. As Justice Thomas
explained in his dissent in Harris, "The Court has not
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previously suggested that constitutional protection ends
where legislative innovation or ingenuity begins. Looking to
the principles that animated the decision in Apprendi and
the bases for the historical practice upon which Apprendi
rested (rather than to the historical pedigree of mandatory
minimums), there are no logical grounds for treating facts
triggering mandatory minimums any differently than facts
that increase the statutory maximum." 6
Justice Breyer, providing the fifth vote in Alleyne, agreed
the application ofApprendi to mandatory minimum statutes
was compelled by "principle" and "logic." He found it
"highly anomalous to read Apprendi as insisting that juries
find sentencing facts that permit a judge to impose a higher
sentence while not insisting that juries find sentencing
facts that require a judge to impose a higher sentence." 6 2
It would be even more "anomalous" to hold that a defendant
has a right to a jury determination of a fact that raises the
penalty floor for his crime from five to seven years, but not if
it raises the floor from life with the possibility of parole after
20 years to life without the possibility of parole. In both
circumstances the defendant is unable to predict the legally
6
authorized penalty range "from the face of the felony." 3
b. Disruption and Prejudice. Another potential objection
to the application of Alleyne to factfinding that alters parole
and probation eligibility is the practical difficulty states may
face ifthey were required to implement the jury right in this
context. Accommodating Alleyne could require the abandonment of appellate oversight of formerly enforceable
limits on judicial sentencing discretion, or the injection of
additional, possibly prejudicial, factfinding into jury trials.
But this argument, like the historical claim, is unlikely
to succeed in defeating what is otherwise a principled
application of the Apprendi rule. In Alleyne, Booker, Blakely,
Southern Union, Cunningham,and Apprendi itself, advocates
opposing the rule have described a similar "parade of horribles," but the Court, as Justice Scalia has observed, has
repeatedly watched that parade pass by without
"1salut[ing].",64

c. Probation and Parole as Mitigated Penalties. A final
argument against applying Alleyne in this context is that
a judicial decision to permit release rather than incarceration mitigates the penalty that would otherwise apply, and
Apprendi does not apply to factfinding that mitigates the
legally prescribed range of punishment.6 5 The statutes
collected here, however, do not involve factfinding that
mitigates the penalty.
Certainly some state statutes that regulate when a judge
may impose a sentence of probation or a suspended
sentence do designate incarceration as the presumptive
sentence, and then assign to the defendant the burden of
proving at sentencing those facts required for probation
eligibility. If a statute is set up this way, the judge's determination of those facts at sentericing does not aggravatethe
penalty range. Rather, incarceration is already within the
range of penalties prior to the judge's factfinding; that
66
factfinding only mitigates or lowers the floor of the range.
But the probation statutes that violate Alleyne are not set up
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this way. Instead, they authorize either probation or incarceration for the offense of conviction and raise the penalty
floor to incarceration, eliminating the probation option,
upon a finding of fact at sentencing.6 7 Probation may have
originated as a form of judicial clemency-mercy that
a court could dispense at its discretion to soften the punishment of what would otherwise always be incarceration.
But once a legislature expressly denies the opportunity for
probation in cases in which a particular fact is established at
sentencing, it has removed the judge's discretion to dispense that leniency. By permitting probation in all cases
except those in which the fact is established, the legislature
has created two separate penalty ranges, one more aggravated than the other. In the words of Alleyne, "the core
crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum
sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each
68
element of which must be submitted to the jury."
The same can be said for statutes that regulate a judge's
authority to set the minimum term an offender must serve
before becoming eligible for release on parole. Through the
1970s, in states that granted judges the discretion to select
a minimum eligibility date at sentencing, accelerating that
date may have been a discretionary act ofleniency. Today, if
a statute permits a judge upon finding certain facts at sentencing to impose a minimum term that is even lower than
a presumptive minimum term, neither Apprendi nor
Alleyne requires a jury to determine those facts; that fact6
finding does indeed mitigate the range. 9 But once a legislature requires a judge to delay the date of eligibility for
release in cases in which a designated fact is established at
sentencing, the legislature has created two separate penalty
ranges, one for cases without that fact, and another, more
7
aggravated range for cases with that fact. o
B. Defining When the Higher Minimum Sentence
is "Mandatory"
The Court in Alleyne limited its stated rule to factfinding
that triggers more aggravated minimum sentences that are
"mandatory," that is, factfinding that "alters the legally prescribed range." Defining what is or is not a mandatory
minimum is a new issue introduced by the Alleyne ruling.
The meaning of this concept can be derived from the
Court's earlier decisions applying the Apprendi rule. The
seven-year minimum in Alleyne was mandatory because it
was enforceable on appeal. Had a judge refused to impose
that sentence and imposed a lesser sentence instead, the
7
government could have secured relief on appeal. ' In
Booker, the Court rendered the Guidelines "advisory" and
compliant with the Sixth Amendment, rather than "mandatory" and unconstitutional, by invalidating those provisions in the Sentencing Reform Act that permitted the
courts of appeals to enforce compliance with those guidelines. It is the potential for reversal on appeal, the Court
72
explained, that makes the sentence mandatory.
Thus, the parole and probation disqualification provisions vulnerable under Alleyne are those that are enforceable on appeal, so that if a judge imposed a sentence that

allowed release sooner than the statute required, the state
could have the sentence overturned. Conversely, if state law
grants complete discretion to a trial judge to delay the date
of eligibility for release after finding an aggravating fact,
then it would not fall within the Alleyne rule, any more than
advisory guidelines fall within Blakely.
Importantly, the seven-year minimum sentence in
Alleyne was considered a mandatory minimum sentence
even though under federal law Alleyne might have earned
time off his sentence in "good" or "earned" time credits,
and secure release in less than seven years. The "legally
prescribed" floor of the range in Alleyne was the seven-year
determinate term, despite the possibility that good or
earned time would reduce the actual sentence served below
seven years.73 Likewise, the possibility or even probability
that good or earned time credits will reduce the period of
incarceration required before eligibility for release from an
indeterminate sentence does not make the minimum
period before eligibility for release any less mandatory.
Alleyne also makes it clear that a minimum term triggered by a judicial finding of fact can be mandatory even
when the judge has the option of imposing the same sentence without the challenged factfinding.74 In Alleyne itself
the judge had discretion to impose seven years without
finding the defendant had brandished a gun. Put differently, Alleyne controls whenever factfinding raises the floor
of the sentencing range even if the ceiling stays the same.
Courts rejecting the application of Alleyne to the sentencing system in Michigan appear to have misunderstood
this point. Michigan's system uses a sentencing grid that
designates, at the intersection of criminal history and
offense level scores, a "recommended" term of incarceration after which the offender would be eligible for parole.
The offense level score is determined by the required
combination of a specified set of offense variables, scored
by the judge at sentencing. 5 The judge is not permitted to
impose an eligibility date earlier than that recommended by
the grid, unless he finds a "substantial and compelling
reason" for doing so, and that finding may be challenged on
appeal.76 The Michigan Court of Appeals has reasoned that
this scheme does not implicate Alleyne because the judicial
factfinding under the state's guidelines merely "inform[s]
the trial judge's sentencing discretion within the maximum
determined by statute and the jury's verdict."7 This conclusion was correct when Harris was in force. But Alleyne
overruled Harris;states are no longer free to use judicial
factfinding at sentencing to "inform" sentencing discretion
within the maximum sentence authorized by conviction,
when that guidance mandates a higher minimum
8
sentence.
Nor does the presence of an exception or departure
provision that would allow a trial judge to impose a lower
minimum sentence in unusual cases make the presumptive minimum term any less "mandatory." Consider the
Supreme Court's earlier treatment of the same issue in
connection with the range ceiling or maximum sentence, in
its decisions in Blakely, Booker, Cunningham, and Gall. The
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Court has consistently rejected the argument that when
a judge is allowed to depart upward from the presumptive
sentence, that presumptive sentence is not the "maximum"
sentence.79 For example, in Gall, the Court reasoned that if
a statute defines a standard or test that must be met in order
to depart from the guidelines, the guidelines are still considered mandatory.8o
Just as a presumptive maximum sets the ceiling or
maximum of a penalty range, regardless of the presence of
a departure provision, so a presumptive minimum sets the
floor despite the presence of one or more exceptions. There
is no basis for treating the effect of a departure provision for
the floor of the range any differently. Kansas lawmakers, for
example, did not regard the statutory exception thereallowing a lesser term if the judge concludes "manifest
injustice" would result'-as protection from Alleyne's
reach.S2 Although Michigan courts refuse to agree, the
"recommended" term before eligibility under that state's
law is the mandatory minimum sentence under Alleyne,
even though a judge could impose a shorter term after
finding a "substantial and compelling reason."
Finally, whenever a statute requires that a trial court
must limit eligibility for release once it determines that
a certain fact is established, that minimum sentence
remains mandatory or "legally prescribed" despite the
possibility that the defendant may obtain earlier release
through clemency.8 3 Alleyne himself could theoretically
receive clemency at some point, too, but that possibility
didn't make his seven-year term less mandatory in the
Court's view.
III: Options for Compliance
This section provides guidance for courts and lawmakers in
states with statutes that may violate the rule in Alleyne. Steps
taken sooner rather than later to correct non-compliant
statutes will help reduce the disruption created by Alleyne,
minimizing the number of cases in which prisoners will be
able to challenge their convictions and sentences. The
options for bringing state law into compliance mirror those
used by states in the wake of the Court's decision in
Blakely.8 4 In states where few statutes were implicated by
Blakely, the fix was fairly simple; in states where the entire
sentencing structure relied on mandatory guideline ranges,
more sweeping measures were necessary.
In states where only a limited number of statutes
include factfinding that restricts probation or parole release,
compliance with Alleyne may require minimal legislative
effort. For example, isolated statutes could be amended to
delete the aggravating fact, or to allow the judge to impose
the lesser sentence despite finding the aggravating fact.
Or, a legislature could replace existing mandatory minimum sentence enhancements with lesser and greater
offenses. If the number of facts triggering mandatory
minimum sentences is small, a legislature could add
a provision guaranteeing the right to a jury trial for those
facts, alongside or after jury trial of the other elements of
the offense, a practice already followed in several states. The
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Kansas legislature, for example, adopted this change for its
"Hard 40" and "Hard 50" statutes, which previously

required the judge determine the facts that triggered
mandatory minimum sentences of forty or fifty years.
The newly enacted statute now gives juries the authority to
decide those aggravating factors, and whether there were
any mitigating factors to offset such a sentence. It also
creates a procedure to empanel new juries if it is necessary
to resentence defendants who are already serving hard-40
or hard-5 0 sentences.8 5
For states that rely heavily upon judicial factfinding to
set terms that must be served before eligibility for parole
release, or to determine eligibility for non-incarceration
sentences, it may be unrealistic to amend separately into
graded offenses all of the different crimes affected by
Alleyne. And treating as an element each of a very large
number of factors would create the same sort of challenges
that faced the Court in Booker under the Federal Guidelines.
Providing for a jury determination of facts implicated by
Alleyne may be more manageable after reducing the number of such facts,8 6 or allowing defendants to admit or opt
for a judicial determination on only those facts implicated
by the Apprendi rule while contesting remaining elements
(something like a partial plea or partial jury waiver).Y7 But
the most obvious remedy is the one adopted by the
Supreme Court in Booker and by a number of states after
Blakely: changing the "legally prescribed" ranges to advisory ranges.8 8 This may involve invalidating or repealing
those aspects of the law that allow appellate courts to
enforce adherence to minimum sentences, thereby permitting judges to exercise their discretion to impose lower
sentences despite finding aggravating factors at sentencing.
States may find the advisory option particularly attractive
if non-compliant provisions are littered throughout the
code or affect a large volume of cases. Take Michigan as an
example. Under the current scheme, the sentencing judge
is required to find and score a number of offense variables
(OVs) to determine the appropriate guidelines range for
a minimum sentence.8 9 If the guidelines were advisory,
the sentencing court would continue to determine the
recommended minimum term before parole eligibility,90
but would consider the "guidelines range as an aid," not
a mandate.9 '
Another alternative might be to make the recommended
restrictions on release part of the guidelines governing the
parolingauthority'sdecision to release rather than part of the
judge's sentencing determination. As parole release
guidelines, they would not affect the range available to the
trial judge at sentencing, escaping challenge under the rule
in Apprendi.
Finally, there is another option for coping with Alleyne
that we do not recommend. A state could shift the presumptive sentence for an offense up to the highest minimum and reserve lower minimum sentences (i.e., earlier
eligibility for release) for those defendants who are able to
prove mitigating factors. As previously discussed, several
states have probation statutes designed in this way,
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presuming incarceration and placing the burden on
defendants to prove certain facts that would permit probation. But as an option for enforcing tiered levels of parole
eligibility based on facts found at sentencing, it makes little
policy sense. This system could produce higher pretrial
burdens if initial charges carried longer potential sentences, as well as longer sentences of incarceration, thereby
raising even further costs that many states are attempting to
lower.

IV.Conclusion
The Court's latest extension of the Apprendi rule in Alleyne
requires courts for the first time to identify when judicial
factfinding mandates a higher minimum sentence. This
has proven to be no simple matter when state statutes
require judges to delay or deny release on probation or
parole depending upon whether specified facts are determined at sentencing. State courts continuing to resist the
application of Alleyne to restrictions on release eligibility are
fighting a losing battle. A legislature need not abandon
efforts to calibrate eligibility for release with factfinding, but
it must select a method of doing so that complies with the
Constitution.
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a defendant's "mitigated offender status" and thereby reduce
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20 percent or both options"); Utah Code § 76-5-302(6) (stating that the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for
aggravated kidnapping is not applicable if the defendant was
under eighteen at time of offense).
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found in Montana. It provides for minimum terms before eligibility for certain offenses, but only if the prosecutor can prove
at an exceptions hearing that certain factors do not apply. See
Mont. Code § 46-18-222 (stating that restrictions on parole
eligibility do not apply if, for example, the offender "was less
than 18 years of age"; had significantly impaired mental
capacity; "was acting under unusual and substantial duress";
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sentence upon a designated factual finding, even though the
sentence is optional without the finding, see Alaska Stat. § 12.
55.125(a)(3) (requiring sentence of ninety-nine years without
parole eligibility upon certain findings for murder, even
though the maximum sentence for murder without those
findings is already ninety-nine years and even though Alaska
Stat. § 12.55.155 permits a judge the discretion to restrict the
eligibility of a prisoner for discretionary parole at sentencing);
State v. Korkow, 2013 WL 6516415 (Alaska 2013) (parole
restrictions under 12.55.155 are completely discretionary).
Mich. Comp. Laws § 777.21(1).
Mich. Comp. Laws §769.34(3); see People v. Hardy, 2014 WL
716145 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014); People v. Herron, 2013 WL
6508495 at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
Herron, 2013 WL 6508495 at *4. Herron found that Michigan's
guidelines did not establish a statutory minimum sentence,
but rather "inform[ed] the trial judge's sentencing discretion
within the maximum determined by statute and the jury's
verdict." Id. at *7 (reasoning "judicial fact-finding to score
Michigan's guidelines falls within the 'wide discretion'
accorded a sentencing judge 'in determining the kind and

or, was an accomplice with relatively minor participation);

extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by

Mont. Code § 46-18-223 (providing that if the court finds by
a preponderance, based on the presentence report and other
factors at the sentencing hearing, that none of the exceptions
apply, "the court shall impose the appropriate mandatory
sentence"); see also State v. Sprinkle, 4 P.3d 1204 (Mont.
2000) (remanding for entry of reasons after court held an
"exceptions hearing" and denied relief).
Another unusual scheme is found in Ohio. Ohio permits
judges to order early release at a post-commitment hearing
after a motion by the defendant. Factfinding at that hearing
that determines eligibility falls outside of the Apprendi rule for
two reasons. First, the defendant must show he qualifies for the
more mitigated sentence; and second, these post-sentencing
findings arguably resemble the eligibility determinations made
by paroling authorities, not those made at initial sentencing,
even though they are made by a judge. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2929.13(F) (providing that a sentence reduction is not permitted for gross sexual imposition or sexual battery "if the
victim is less than thirteen years of age"); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2929.20 (providing that a court "shall not grant a judicial
release" at a hearing unless the court finds "[t]hat a sanction
other than a prison term would adequately punish the offender
and protect the public from future criminal violations by the
eligible offender"); State v. Hunt, 2005-Ohio-3144, 2005 WL
1476887 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (vacating a defendant's sentencing reduction when the trial court did not make the statutorily required findings in granting the defendant's motion for
judicial release); see also Alaska Stat. § 12.55.125(j).
E.g., United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.
2013) (agreeing the district court was "legally obligated to
sentence Reingold to the minimum five-year prison term
mandated by 18 U.S.C. §2252(b)(1) for any distribution of
child pornography").
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235 (2005) ("The
sentencing judge would therefore have been reversed had he

law"' and that "Michigan's sentencing guidelines are within
the 'broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, [which] does not violate the Sixth Amendment."' The
Herron court reasoned that "[w]hile judicial fact-finding in
scoring the sentencing guidelines produces a recommended
range for a minimum sentence of an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum of which is set by law ... it does not establish
a mandatory minimum; therefore, the exercise of judicial
discretion guided by the sentencing guidelines scored through
judicial fact-finding does not violate due process or the Sixth
Amendment's right to a jury trial." (internal quotations and
citations omitted)). At least six later decisions in Michigan
have followed Herron.
So far, only two judges in Michigan have taken this position,
agreeing with the defendant in Herron and arguing Herron was
wrongly decided. People v. Lockridge, 2014 WL 563648 at *3
(Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (Beckering, J., concurring) (stating "the
guidelines range within which a sentencing court in Michigan is
required to fix a minimum term of imprisonment is itself
a legally prescribed mandatory minimum" and explaining that
"since Michigan's sentencing scheme requires the court to rely
upon Offense Variables ("OVs") to calculate the appropriate
guidelines range for a minimum sentence, it is finding facts to
determine the sentence range authorized by law"); see also
Lockridge, 2014 WL 563648 at *11 (Shapiro, J., concurring).
E.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 289 (2007)
("[B]road discretion to decide what facts may support an
enhanced sentence, or to determine whether an enhanced
sentence is warranted in any particular case, does not shield
a sentencing system from the force of our decisions. If the
jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if,
instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose the
longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied."); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304-05, (2004);
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005).
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Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5803 ("The mandatory provisions of this
subsection shall not apply to any person where such application would result in a manifest injustice."); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-6707c) (same).
For similar exceptions, see Chism v. People, 80 P.3d 293
(Colo. 2003) (permitting judges, upon application of the
prosecuting attorney, to waive ineligibility for probation); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 533.060 (providing that when an offense involved
a weapon capable of causing serious bodily injury or death,
the offender "shall not be eligible for probation" unless the
offender "establishes that the person against whom the
weapon was used had previously... engaged in... domestic
violence and abuse" against the offender); Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 269, § 10 (stating that "[a person] holding a valid firearm
identification card shall not be subject to any mandatory
minimum sentence imposed by this paragraph"); Mont. Code
§ 46-14-312 (excepting any mandatory minimum sentence if
the court finds the defendant suffered from a mental disease
or defect at the time of the offense); N.J. Stat. § 2C:43-6.5.
See People v. Woodward, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 123-24 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011) ("Finding a defendant ineligible for probation
is not a form of punishment, because probation itself is an act
of clemency on the part of the trial court."); People v. Benitez,
26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (probation is an act
of clemency). These cases relied on an earlier case which in
turn relied on Harris and McMillan. See In re Varnell, 70 P.3d
1037, 1044-45 (Cal. 2003).
See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 (2007)
("States have modified their systems in the wake of Apprendi
and Blakely to retain determinate sentencing. They have done
so by calling upon the jury-either at trial or in a separate
sentencing proceeding-to find any fact necessary to the
imposition of an elevated sentence. As earlier noted, California
already employs juries in this manner to determine statutory
sentencing enhancements.... Other States have chosen to
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permit judges genuinely 'to exercise broad discretion... within a statutory range,' which, 'everyone agrees,'
encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal.... California may follow the paths taken by its sister States or otherwise alter its
system, so long as the State observes Sixth Amendment limitations declared in this Court's decisions." (internal citations
omitted)).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6620, House Bill No. 2002 (2013).
See CRIMPROC, supra note 12, at § 26.4(i) nn.188-88.1
(listing states that opted to provide jury determinations for
aggravating facts after Blakely rather than make binding
guideline ranges advisory); State v. Essex, 838 N.W.2d 805,
812-13 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013).
See Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior Convictions: Managing the
Demise of the Prior Conviction Exception to Apprendi, forthcoming S.M.U. L. Rev., at 5-9, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2459682 (describing similar approaches adopted
by states for handling proof of prior convictions).
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). For
example, the Tennessee governor established a task force to
remedy the infirmities of the state's criminal justice system
after the Supreme Court announced Blakely. This resulted in
the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 2005, which
announced the sentencing guidelines to be advisory. See
David Wilstermann, Administrative Office of the Courts,
Impact of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 2005 on
Tennessee's Criminal Justice System: A Report of the Governor's Task Force on the Use of Enhancement Factors in
Criminal Sentencing (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.
tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/task force-annual_
report_2006.pdf.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 777.21.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.8(1).
See People v. Lockridge, 2014 WL 563648, at *12 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2014) (Beckering, J., concurring) (citing Mich. Comp.
Laws § 769.34(2)).
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